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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Allan Evans, State (TNR)

(DIA)

50X1

Colonel J. C. Jeffries, Jr., USA (ACSI)

Captain G. K. Nicodemus, USN (ONI)

Lt. Colonel C. H. Long, USAF (AFCIN 2B3)

Chief Designate,

50X1

Policy Staff, NSA

SUBJECT: SNIE 42-2-62: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH KOREA

1. The attached terms of reference has been approved by the Board of National Estimates and are submitted for your consideration.

2. The USIB target is 29 August. In view of the relatively tight schedule for this estimate, we propose that these terms of reference be considered together with informal oral or written contributions at the same meeting.

*gang*  
3. It is requested that your representatives meet with us on Thursday at 1000 in Room 7E26 Langley building to discuss these TRs and to provide informal oral or written contributions to this estimate.

*Chester L. Cooper*  
CHESTER L. COOPER  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

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6 August 1962

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: SNIE 42-2-62: SHORT-TERM  
PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH KOREA

THE PROBLEM

To assess the present situation in South Korea and to  
estimate probable developments over the next few months.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. THE REGIME

A. SCNR Chairman Pak and ROK CIA Director Kim Chong-pil:

Strengths and weaknesses of each, support within  
SCNR, armed forces, and public; power and influence  
of CIA. Does Pak want to get rid of Kim? If so,  
what inhibits him? Would Kim seek to oust Pak; could

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he do so? What are the prospects for Pak's continuation in power? In the Pak-Kim relationship? And for the maintenance and growth of the power of Kim and the CIA? What would be the consequences of the removal of Pak from power? Removal of Kim?

B. The SCNR:

Factional groupings and alternate power centers. How do they line up with respect to Pak and Kim? Do any of them have independent sources of influence in the armed forces? In the Cabinet and administrative services? Are there any existing or potential coup groups?

C. The Armed Forces:

Attitudes, morale, and efficiency. How will these develop over the next few months?

D. What are the political and economic objectives of the leadership? What have they achieved? Where have they failed? Are they apt to do better in the near future?

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II. THE POLITICAL PARTIES

- A. Current status and plans; relationships to the junta and its leading members. Are they likely to play more important roles?
- B. What are the prospects for a return to civilian government?

III. THE PUBLIC

- A. Degree of support for the regime; attitudes of politically conscious groups (the business community, students, and intellectuals, etc.); evidences of hostility, active and passive.
- B. What is the economic situation and how does it affect public attitudes? Are economic conditions likely to improve soon?

IV. THE ROK-US RELATIONSHIP

- A. What is the attitude of the leadership to the ROK-US relationship? To US criticism of their policies and actions? Is there evidence of increased ROK independence

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of action in economic, military, and foreign policy spheres? How will status-of-forces problems develop? Will ROK-US relations improve, deteriorate, or remain about the same?

- B. What efforts are Communists making to exploit divergencies between the US and ROK? With what success?

#### V. OTHER FOREIGN RELATIONS

- A. What is the status of normalization talks with Japan? What are the prospects for conclusion of a satisfactory agreement?
- B. What significant changes have occurred in the ROK approach to other countries, particularly the Asian-African neutralists? What efforts have been made to strengthen ties with other anti-Communist Asian states?

#### VI. THE COMMUNIST THREAT -- INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

- A. What is the nature of the present Communist threat to the ROK? Is it likely to alter significantly over the next few months? Is there greater receptivity than heretofore to North Korean overtures toward the ROK?

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